

Chapter 1

Language and power in the Habsburg Empire: The historical context

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1. Introduction

Was the language policy in the Habsburg Monarchy from the mid-19th century onwards 'repressive and assimilatory' or 'pluralistic and emancipatory'?¹ In response to this question, which permeates more or less explicitly all the papers in this book, we must put a number of counter-questions: 'repressive' or 'pluralistic' towards whom? Who created this policy, what institutions formed the background? Who or what was its target?

In order to produce at least some outline answers to these questions, we believe it is essential to preface the set of individual studies with a number of remarks about the general historical context of the period under study, from the point of view not only of the history of events, but also constitutional and administrative history. If we enquire about the character of the exercise of power, we must also ask about the sphere of operations of the actors involved and about their social base. We must, in addition, take account of the terminology they used.² 'State', 'People', 'Nation', 'Government': all of these words, and the ideas they denote, underwent considerable development in our period of study, which had a marked impact on the political history of the age: to the inter-group conflicts that are discussed in this book we must add the nature of a continually renewed negotiation of power that found its expression in a struggle for the necessary materials, but also for the necessary vocabulary. 'Nation', 'people' and so on were not descriptive labels in this process, but paradigms for whose establishment the struggles took place.

In these conflicts, however, we find no groups who stand in a hierarchical relationship to one another and fight one another, such as the 'central state' and the 'nationalities'. We see, rather, a range of constantly changing models of the exercise of power (such as absolutist, reform-absolutist, corporative, federalist, democratic, and so on) that are manifest in differing structures, persons and groups and constantly found new, fragile and temporary balances in the battle to extend their sphere of influence.

All the contributions in this book reflect a balance of this sort and its specific potential for change in the geographical and institutional context of the time. These contexts differ considerably within the Habsburg monarchy, and this is reflected in the broad range of topics of the various contributions. For all the differences, however, the conflicts break out simultaneously along the same fault lines that run through the entire political fabric of the 19th century and along which the change in social structure from authoritarian principality to civil constitutional state occurred.

These fault lines are of ‘medium-term duration’ in Braudel’s sense.³ They are rooted in the problem areas of ancient Europe and, from the time of its decline, determine all the possibilities of conflict in subsequent eras. To come to terms with these in their historical dimension, it seems sensible to us to begin our historical overview with a representation of the conditions of social organisation in the early modern era (cf. section 2). This will be followed by a survey of the period treated in this book, which extends from the end of the 18th century until World War I – the ‘long 19th Century of Austrian History’, as Helmut Rumpler calls it, borrowing Eric Hobsbawm’s formulation⁴ (cf. section 3). By analogy section 4 provides a short characterisation of language policy in the period mentioned, and here the resulting historical fields of tension are systematised and related to the separate sections.

2. The prehistory: Terminology and constitutional conditions of the early modern period

As the superordinate historical frame of reference for this book, we took the ‘Habsburg Monarchy’, a term that must be analysed at the outset.

If we attempt to apply this name to the conditions of the early modern period – meaning the time from the end of the Middle Ages down to the middle of the 18th century – we encounter considerable problems. The term ‘Habsburg Monarchy’ is in fact a paraphrase, used from the middle of the 19th century, of the formulation ‘*Monarchia Austriaca*’, which is found from the early 18th century on. Both apply to the entire sphere of influence of the Habsburg rulers, but they do not have the status of a legally valid term. If we wish to find a term of this sort, we look in vain for any name for the whole territory, in the sense of a state, but must begin with the power-holders themselves, that is to say, with the members of the Habsburg dynasty.

From the late Middle Ages a genealogical entity was able to concentrate in its hands legal titles and claims to power over a number of different areas of rule, mostly countries and cities. Each of these areas had to be seen as an entity in itself and shared only the dynasty with other areas. The areas where the Habsburgs ruled were both legally and geographically heterogeneous. A Habsburg dynast of the 17th century was as much King of Bohemia as Lord of Trieste, Count of Tyrol, or Duke of Carinthia. The last example also illustrates the fact that the title of a ruler does not necessarily have to relate to an enclosed territorial entity: for example, within the territory of the Duchy of Carinthia there were, until 1803, enclaves belonging to the Prince-Archbishopric of Salzburg.

But what are we to understand by the term *Land* [country] if it is not a territorial entity? In the terminology of the early modern period *Land* normally means the *Stände* [= estate(s)] that, together with the ruler, constitute the particular government of the country. *Stände* should be thought of as a group of people subdivided into three or four *curiae* or assemblies: the nobility, subdivided into the higher rank lords and knights; the priesthood; the delegates of the cities and market-towns; and it was also possible that representatives of the peasantry took part in the meetings of the estates, the so-called *Landtage* [parliaments]. Whilst elected and representative elements could be recognised in the last two cases, this was not at all true of the first two *curiae*, who did not represent but constituted the country. The estates were politically active together with the hereditary ruler, who was ceremonially 'elected' by them, and they were mostly occupied with negotiations on matters of taxation, foreign and military policy at the level of the *Land*. Matters of low-level jurisdiction, low-level taxes and the associated administration belonged to the realm of the fundamental power which the members of the estates exercised over their properties, and the ruler had practically no influence over these. The subjects, who had no representation in the council, scarcely came into contact with the ruler.

Although it is completely appropriate to compare the estates in the Habsburg lands with the French 'états généraux', it is essential to make one fundamental distinction: the French estates were focused on an absolutist centre, whereas in the Habsburg realm the estates always found their expression at the level of the *Land*, in every separate territory, from the Kingdom of Bohemia to the City of Trieste. The local elite, therefore, only encountered the Habsburg dynast in his function as their own ruler, whose scope for action was restricted by their own participation in the estate. In the Kingdom of Hungary the estates even enjoyed, until its abolition in 1687, an attested right of resistance against the king.

It is clear that this situation was the source of a large potential for conflict. Indeed the history of the early modern period is permeated with disputes between ruler and estates, who also become to an ever-growing degree politically aware. Given the basic conflict, this gives rise to a more complex demeanour: on the one hand, the resistance of the nobles from the 16th century onwards often turned into denominational disputes between Protestant nobility and Catholic rulers; and on the other hand, we already see, in the early modern period, conflicts between German rulers and non-German estates, although we need to understand characterisations such as these in a fluctuating, proto-national sense. In both cases the fault-line is never unambiguous or homogeneous. As a graphic example of this kind of multi-layered conflict, we may take the defeat of the Bohemian estates in the Battle of the White Mountain (1620), which resulted in a marked increase in the importance of German compared to Czech, which had hitherto been predominant, as well as a massive boost to the counter-reformation. Above all it increased the power of the ruler and diminished that of the estates. Much the same could be said of Hungary concerning the time after the failure of the Nobles' Revolt in 1671 and the successful campaigns against the Ottoman Empire after 1683.

Completely independently of all the power labels mentioned so far, most Habsburg rulers also took the title of an *Erwählter Römischer Kaiser* [elected Roman Emperor]. This function of the supreme head of the 'Holy Roman Empire of Germany' was obtained through election by the college of electors⁵ and coronation with the imperial insignia. Power in the Empire had practically no function: the princes under the emperor enjoyed, in their own territories, practically complete internal freedom and a great deal of external freedom. In this context it is important to be clear that Habsburg rule corresponded only partially to that of the Empire. Hungary, for example – unlike Bohemia – never belonged to the Empire.

The reader may notice that we have so far avoided using the term 'Austria', although from the Middle Ages it seemed to play a latent role in the designation of the Habsburg realm. 'Austria'⁶ originally referred to the Margravate, then the Duchy and finally the Archduchy of 'Austria above and below the Enns'.⁷ In the Middle Ages and then in the early modern period the term was already being transferred to the dynasty, but also to a complex of 'Austrian' lands that was distinct from those of Hungary and Bohemia. The formulation 'Casa de Austria', as we find it from the 16th century onwards, mainly refers to the ruling dynasty with its legal titles but not to the lands over which they ruled. This conception also underlies the *Österreichisches Kaiserthum* [Austrian Empire], founded in 1804, which only gradually came to be understood as an 'Imperial

State', that is, as a constitutional umbrella term for all those countries directly ruled by the Habsburgs. This lasting change in the concept of 'Austria', however, was preceded in the 18th century by a decisive change in political structure which merits some brief explanation.

2.1. Enlightened absolutism

From the late Middle Ages on, the Habsburg rulers attempted repeatedly to unify their various legal titles, because the power of the estates and the heterogeneous legal situation in the different territories made government considerably more difficult than was the case, for instance, in France, which was more strongly centralised. Despite the failure of many plans to consolidate their territories into a single kingdom, from the 16th century the Habsburgs pursued a consistent policy of depriving the estates of their power. In the process they attempted to obtain direct access to the population and thereby to the economic and military potential of the countries, and they made frequent use of the instruments of power of the Catholic Reformation. An example of this is provided by schools and universities, through which the Jesuits, who had been summoned by the Habsburgs into their territories, increasingly suppressed the *Land-schaftsschulen* or 'Estates schools'.⁸ In the late 17th and early 18th centuries the Habsburg rulers were already making attempts to intervene decisively in the relationship between landowners and serfs⁹ or in the economic life of a country.¹⁰ The reforms of Maria Theresia (1740–1780) and Josef II (1780–1790) gave a very broad base to the necessary administrative infrastructure, which gave the ruler the possibility of complete access to a subject without recourse to intermediary bodies. The development of a centrally structured legal and civil administration, reaching even the lowest levels, the creation of a secular and 'public' school system, and the tendency towards systematic codifying of legal ordinances were characteristic of this period, together with the greatly increasing involvement of civilian bodies in public administration. For the ordinary citizen, who had hitherto had little opportunity to participate in the fabric of politics, a bureaucratic career now became possible. There he was able to wield that power which had been removed, on a grand scale, from the nobility and clergy, and at the territorial level from the estates. Examples of the latter are the dissolution of the monasteries and the abolition of serfdom under Josef II.

It is already legitimate, in this context, although with some omissions, to speak of the 'State' in the modern sense of the word, that is, of a

secularised, bureaucratically imbued community with no legal bodies between the (same) citizens and the Sovereign or the State. It is clear that Enlightenment thinking underlies this. But the fact that this thinking underwent a specific adaptation to the Habsburg circumstances, and did not, as happened in France, lead to an overturning of the prevailing circumstances, was a consequence of the political situation. This may be illustrated by the revoking of many of Josef's reforms by his successor, Leopold II (1790–1792). All in all, during the period of its disputes with France (1792–1815) the Habsburg state could not countenance a massive confrontation with the elites of the *Ancien Régime*.

3. The events, and the constitutional and administrative history of Austria's 'long 19th century'

The wars against France had another result, the consequences of which were to make a permanent mark on political reality in the ensuing 'long 19th century': partly influenced by the decision of a number of German states to leave the Holy Roman Empire and by Napoleon's dissolution of the spiritual principalities in 1803, Franz II (1792–1835) gave up the Roman-German imperial crown, and with the *Reichsdeputationshauptschluß* of 1806 the Empire ceased to exist. In 1804 Franz, following the example of Napoleon, who had already crowned himself Emperor of France, founded the 'Empire of Austria' referred to above and declared himself Emperor (as 'Austrian Emperor Franz I').

In place of the vanished empire there came into being, in the form of the 'German Confederation' [*Deutscher Bund*], an institution in which, in the course of the 19th century, the idea of a nation state gained the upper hand at the expense of the idea of a federation of principalities, just as Prussia won politically over Austria in 1866. The foundation of a German Nation State in 1870–1871 under the leadership of Prussia is, of course, not part of Austrian history, but must be included in the background ideas to the ethnic disputes in the second half of the century. It also explains the later massive resistance of German-speaking Austrians to the Habsburg state. These problems outlived the monarchy and culminated in 1938 in the surrender of Austrian independent sovereignty. It must be remembered that after 1804 'Austria' referred to a state, but one that had dynastic rather than ethnic connotations.

3.1. The 'Vormärz' period – Restoration (1815–1848)

The period between the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the Revolution of (March) 1848, often described as *Vormärz* or *Restoration*, is usually associated with the image of a police and censorship state, embodied in the person of State Chancellor Metternich. In fact this period is marked by a consolidation of the authoritarian state in which self-administering bodies such as the estates continued to lose ground, but in which the nobility and middle class forces continued to be able to share in the state power apparatus. The state behaved in a fashion varying between restrictive and aggressive in the face of all those movements which, invoking the ideas of the 'enlightenment' revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries, worked for a constitutional form of state, for the principle of nationhood or for a civil-democratic society. Here it is important to mention that both the 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' and the 'enlightened-liberal' modes of thought may be derived from Josephinian ideas.

It is in this dual nature that one of the fundamental problems of Habsburg power may be seen. The Habsburg state was never able to circumvent the incompatibility of the modern bureaucratic state with the dynastic feudal type of rule. In the case of the Habsburg monarchy neither of these principles of ruling ever had any national connotations, but were rather influenced by the idea of the dynastic state, which – in the 'national' 19th century – gave it a rather anachronistic appearance.

No doubt the situation depicted here, frustrating as it was for an increasingly broad section of the population, constituted the primary background to the revolution; but the personal and structural crises of the 1830s and 40s should also not be forgotten: Ferdinand I (1835–1848) was mentally in no state to conduct the business of government. Moreover, the old form of courtly centralism could no longer keep pace with the ever-growing burden of administration, so that the state could not avoid giving the appearance of being ponderous, restrictive and extremely inactive.

3.2. Revolution and neo-absolutism

A more detailed examination of the scenes and events of the revolution shows that there was indeed a struggle against the same power-machine in the various places, but that the underlying reasons for this were extremely varied.

The primary goal of the Vienna March Revolution was the establishment of a constitutional state and also the establishment of civil rights and liberties. This was the beginning of the struggle for a basic set of state laws which was only concluded in 1867 and which was characterised by the unwillingness of the imperial and state leadership to see in their subjects citizens with whom they could collaborate creatively for the common good. In this conflict we still see the clear lasting effect of the dispute in the early modern period between ruler and estates about the exercise of power, since there, too, 'absolutism' and 'self-administration' were diametrically opposed.

In 1848 it was, in fact, still the *Land*¹¹ that rose up to strengthen its political power-base, and this is shown by the beginning of the Prague Movement, which attempted initially, under the title of a 'Bohemia' that was as much German- as Czech-speaking, to establish a Bohemian-Moravian-Silesian complex of territories, before it took on any markedly Czech-nationalist features.

The risings in Upper Italy and Hungary were authentically 'national', even though they grew out of a similar set of problems, and here wars of secession were fought, under a national title, against a power that was perceived as alien. In the process, the 'old aristocratic' and 'new bourgeois' elites tended to merge, in much the same way as the 'old landowning' and 'new national' interests. The target in both cases was Habsburg dominance, perceived on the one hand as a centralist state that was undermining its own power-base, and on the other as an authoritarian 'anational' entity that had no place for either self-administration or for the expression of nationhood.

Nor should we overlook the 'social' dimension of the revolution that was manifest in the Viennese Workers' Revolt of October 1848. Here the demands were directed towards a democratic increase in the number of those who had a share in the state. The fact that the peasants no longer had a role in this is derived from the successful fulfilment of their most urgent demand – the abolition of land control¹² and the associated subservient relationship.

At the end of 1848 Franz Josef I (1848–1916) ascended the throne, and after the middle of the following year the last revolutionary uprisings were suppressed. A draft constitution elaborated by the first *Reichsrat* [imperial council] in Kremsier, the first representative body at the level of the whole state, was rejected by the Emperor. Another version was imposed by the minister responsible, but was repealed very soon afterwards, and because of this withholding of the constitution the period from 1851–1860 is generally referred to as 'neo-absolutism'. Useful inno-

vations in the technicalities of administration were retained, such as the ministerial system and the system of district administration, but also certain liberal advances such as the abolition of land control and the freedom of teaching and learning in the universities, and because of these there was also an increase in the opportunities for the state to participate in its own development. In practice the period after the revolution was characterised by a great deal of reformist activity that concentrated on extending the powers of the centralised state.

At the same time, however, the national paradigm also increased in significance because it showed itself, under the influence of general European developments, to be a flexible catalyst for the claims to power of a variety of groups. In addition the state happened to take on a predominantly German character in most of the crownlands¹³ and thereby became vulnerable to national arguments, even if most polemics were directed against the dynasty or the state itself. It was precisely in the development of the neo-absolutist state, where German predominance at state level took on more or less explicitly the role of a stabilising element, that the German language provided a useful target for national-liberal arguments.

3.3. *Constitutional state and the battle of the nationalities*

In 1860 neo-absolutism was brought to an end by the implementation of a parliamentary constitution¹⁴ which, despite modifications in the following year, was not able to sort out the fundamental structural problems of the state. No Hungarian deputies were sent to the first Austrian parliament in 1861, because Hungary continued to see itself as a separate entity, in both a legal and an ethnic sense. The Bohemian and Moravian deputies also refused to take part in the work of the *Reichsrat* for similar reasons.

This principle was given a legal basis in the *Ausgleich* [settlement] of 1867, when Hungary was incorporated into the overall structure of the empire as a partner with equal rights. In terms of the settlement the *K(aiserlich)-K(öniglich)* [Royal-Imperial] monarchy became *K(aiserlich) u(nd) K(öniglich)* [Royal and Imperial], which was supposed to demonstrate the upgrading of the *Kingdom* of Hungary. The popular names for the two parts, 'Cisleithania' and 'Transleithania' (deriving from the River Leitha which marked the border) were a paraphrase of the new legal situation. Hungary acquired a new government and its own parliament, which only collaborated with the Viennese equivalents in matters of foreign policy, the armed forces and the joint state budget.

The 'settlement' was expressed in separate constitutional laws for the Cisleithanian and Transleithanian regions. An essential point in the Cislei-

thanian basic law of 1867 is found in §19, the section which laid down the equal rights of all *Volksstämme* [branches of the people] and all *landesübliche Sprachen* [languages normally used in particular lands] within the state. This formulation gave the appearance of a pluralistic policy but is problematic for a number of reasons. In the first place the Habsburg concept of the state refused to countenance the formulations ‘nationality’ or ‘national language’: *Volksstamm* and *landesübliche Sprache* are legally compatible with a traditional concept of (multi-lingual or rather ‘a-nationally’ conceived) ‘lands’, whereas ‘nationality’ does not have the value of a constitutional entity. Furthermore, the state ‘recognises’ equality of rights, but its competence between preservation and change of the status quo is not made clear. In addition, the questions concerning who was entitled to the label *Volksstamm*, or how normality of use could be established in a multilingual territory, carried within them an enormous potential for conflict, and these are the subjects of the various contributions in this book.

Cisleithania was still made up of the historic units of the early modern period,¹⁵ although the national paradigm was constantly gaining ground, particularly after the events of 1866–1867. Because of the defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1866 and their exclusion from the German Confederation, ‘German Austrians’ increasingly became ‘Austrian Germans’,¹⁶ one nationality among many others who were competing for the equal rights guaranteed to them by the constitution. In fact, the Austrian Law Bulletin had been published in 10 different languages since 1849.

If one looks at subsequent developments, one must be aware that behind the massive conflagration of nationality conflicts there were relics of the old structures that we have outlined above. Particularly in the conflict over Bohemia, the principle of the historic unit played an important role for many years alongside the Czech-national question, since after 1867 Bohemia hoped for a similar settlement to that of Hungary and for a similar recognition of its own integrity as a state.

At the same time a fundamental change in the political conflict was affected by far reaching social changes, the economic growth of an increasingly broad middle class and the constantly growing pressure of the workers for participation in the state. In the last decades of the century the franchise was continually being expanded,¹⁷ and in 1907 the first elections took place according to the (male only) general, equal, direct and secret ballot. In this way quantity became a political category,¹⁸ and radicality a political argument. In fact the German–Slavic conflicts about Bohemia resulted in tumultuous disputes in parliament and in a marked radicalisation of public life.

After the 1880s the national conflict took on an additional dimension in the form of the appearance of mass political parties (in Cisleithania, for instance, there were already social democratic and Christian social parties as well as the group of German national parties) and these lent an ideological dimension to national agitation.

However, the massive struggle between the nationalities that marked the final decades of the Habsburg monarchy had two dimensions: it was a battle *for* the state¹⁹ which, according to the political constellation, could also turn into a battle *against* the state. This was demonstrated, for example, by the obstruction of parliament by the German group in 1897–1898.²⁰ As a result of this the state was unable to establish ‘equal rights of all branches of the people’, since every change to the status quo was interpreted as a political advance by one group at the expense of another with state support.

Nevertheless the possibility of dividing up the Habsburg state into individual nation-states only came to be seen as a serious option during World War I. Until then the contradictory anachronistic structure of the Habsburg realm – which perhaps for that very reason was so large – had offered most of the nationalities a measure of support which they would otherwise have lacked in the face of the other national blocks in Europe, particularly Germany and Russia. This attitude of the nationalities was based on a pragmatic assessment of the situation, rather than on any pluralistic or nationalities policy in the Habsburg monarchy. Strictly speaking there was no such policy in the modern sense of the word, since the dynastic a-national Habsburg state never actually accepted the principle of the ethnic ‘nation’, and indeed could not accept it without calling into question the unique principles of its own structure.

4. Language policy in the Habsburg monarchy and its interference with historical fields of tension

The constitutional and political development of the Habsburg state can therefore be interpreted as the result of and as a mirror for its heterogeneous interior structure. The same is true for language development and the development of language policies which, because of the implications they had for national rights, were closely interwoven with the development of the constitution and the administration. With this in mind, I shall attempt to trace back the problems dealt with in this book to the constitutional-historical background sketched out above – in accordance with the original question concerning Habsburg language policies – and,

based on the varied reasons for not being able to carry through 'equal rights', to show the impossibility of such policies.

With respect to nationality and language, the expression *Gleichstellung* [equal rights] only becomes comprehensible in the so-called Bohemian Charter, an imperial concession that was a reaction to the Prague revolutionary movement of 1848. The principle that was postulated in that concession can be found in the Pillersdorf Constitution (25. IV. 1848) as the 'inviolability of nationality', in the Imposed Constitution (4. III. 1849) as the 'inviolable right [of every branch of the people] to the maintenance and promotion of their nationality and language'. The latter formulation is based on § 1 of the Kremsier draft constitution which was never put into practice and in which even a state guarantee of the basic principle of equal rights had been envisaged. In the end the principle of equal rights was taken up in § 19 of the Constitution of 1867 as it had been formulated in the March Constitution of 1849.

The role of the state and its immediate institutions remained open – thus providing the starting point for future conflicts. This was also the case for the exact legal definition of the languages in their relationship to ethnic and/or political categories. It is striking, for example, that the statistical data that were collected²¹ every ten years after 1880 focused on the *Umgangssprache*, i. e. the language of everyday usage. Although the term *Umgangssprache* was not clearly defined with respect to the language regulations, the censuses became one of the catalysts in national-political language conflict. In addition, from our present-day point of view, we need to ask what exactly was meant by a language that could be defined as 'German', 'Italian', 'Hungarian', 'Ruthenian', etc. and could be measured in categories determined by comparability and equal rights. After all, the degree to which those languages were standardised and fitted accordingly into the linguistic, language-political and ideological infrastructure varied considerably.

If we consider the concrete linguistic situation within Cisleithania, we can distinguish, in terms of contemporary categories, between historical and non-historical languages,²² where German and Italian, for example, had already experienced the development into a written language in the course of the early modern period, Czech and Hungarian had flowered as literary languages in the first half of the 19th century, whilst Ruthenian or Romanian only completed this kind of development in the second half of the century.

It is revealing that this historical evaluation contributed to a fundamental asymmetry in respect of the prestige of individual languages, which must always be thought of as a basic constant of Habsburg lan-

guage policy and which, of course, was only implicitly measurable by means of the *Umgangssprachenerhebungen* [statistics concerning everyday language]. The Italian and Polish speaking elites in Upper Italy and Galicia, and ultimately the equivalent Hungarian speakers after 1836/1867 (for until then Latin had been the official state language) could – in terms of social prestige – count themselves equal to German speakers. This could not be said of Ruthenian and Romanian – languages from the predominantly agrarian region. In this dispute between ‘historical’ and ‘non-historical’ languages (and therefore also nationalities), as happened, for instance, in Trieste or Galicia, we see reflected the social upheaval in those regions where, along with increasing democratisation, certain underprivileged social groups were competing for a share of power.

In this respect the German language constituted a special case. With the basic state law, both state centralism in Cisleithania and the German demand for attested predominance were abandoned; both tendencies, however, had arisen together particularly in the thrust for the bureaucratic expansion of the state in the Josephinian period, in the *Vormärz* period and during neo-absolutism. This situation gave the German language a dual role: on the one hand, as the language of a more or less autochthonous, extensive and privileged section of the population, and on the other as the language of the state and its organs. These two aspects merged into one another, because the state functioned as a catalyst of social advance; but quite often resistance to German was simultaneously resistance to the state as such, a resistance that fed on the potential conflicts of the early modern period until well into the 19th century. On top of this came the dimension mentioned above of the struggles of other language groups, in which the state became involved, to break the preponderance of a given language by the promotion of the underprivileged languages. The contributions in this book will illustrate this complex picture.

In a context like that in Bukovina or Galicia, both formerly parts of Poland and therefore untouched in the early modern period by the Habsburgs’ centralising tendencies, the language conflict was of course articulated differently compared to traditional Habsburg lands such as Trieste or Bohemia. In Bukovina Habsburg rule set up state structures in 1773 by means of which an alien German-speaking civil service could express its power. In the process, a policy of linguistic pluralism and discursive integration of the Romanian-speaking strata ‘destined for civilisation’ would strengthen the position of the state. An analogous situation may be seen in Galicia, where the conflict between estates and the state was clearly focused in the battle over the official language and where the state sought to create support by upgrading an underprivileged language, in

this case Ruthenian. This type of policy, however, could no longer be supported by the regional elite, particularly after 1867.

This broadly outlined tendency is also to be found in the chapter on the discourse of hegemony to the extent that the ‘Organisational Proposals for Grammar Schools and Professional Schools’ of 1849 still postulated some form of primacy for German in the educational process, which already had to be played down in the decree of 1859. At the level of the whole state the requirement of German as the only state language goes together with the requirement for increased centralisation.

The situation was even more complex in those areas where German was not only the language of bureaucracy, but was in addition spoken by a group of people who set the tone both economically and culturally. In Pilsen, for example, the victim of the state plan was an equilibrium in education that was originally desired by both the Czech and the German speaking groups. The postulate of 1867, that no-one could be required to learn any language other than the native language, led to a radical confrontation between the two language groups, who no longer argued, *as* the city council, in favour of equal rights, but rather quarrelled *in* the council about predominance. The example of Trieste illustrates in a similar way the limited effect of state intervention in matters of practical language politics, because in the judiciary, even after 1867, Italian was still dominant and it was only around the turn of the century that it had to give way, at least partially, to the reality of pressure from Slovenian. The case of Trieste can also be taken as an illustration of the model, outlined above, of state upgrading of an underprivileged language – in this case Slovenian – as an instrument against the local Italian-speaking elites and the resultant polarisation.

In Lombardy the state intervened as a result of the uncontested status of Italian without its German connotations. In this way the strategy we have outlined becomes clearer: discursive integration of local stakeholders into the total ideology of the state in exchange for the consensus of the elites. The destruction of this equilibrium was manifest not in any internal social conflict, as perhaps in Bohemia, but in a military confrontation with an ‘external enemy’.²³ These observations could be continued with examples from many other crownlands.

If, as a result of some of the following contributions in this book, there seems to be some contradiction between an apparently pluralistic legal situation and the repressive language policy, this is entirely logical against the background of what has been said, once the a-national centralised state had lost the possibility, after 1867, of actively moulding a society, and the state was only able to devote its attention to creating a balance

of local and social forces. Even the strong tendency towards discursive integration should not be seen as an expression of pluralism, but as a traditional need to come to terms with the historically rooted and powerful local elites.

Finally, therefore, let us return again to the question we asked at the outset concerning the nature of Habsburg language policy. Instead of an answer we can suggest a reformulation: what role did language policy play in the Habsburg monarchy in the dispute between an a-national dynastic concept of rule and the paradigm of the civil-national society, and how did this conflict react towards itself? A multiple and widely compartmentalised set of possible answers may be found in the following contributions.

Appendix

Total	1880	1890	1900	1910
German	8 008 864 (36.75%)	8 461 580 (36.05%)	9 170 939 (35.78%)	9 950 266 (35.58%)
Czech – Moravian – Slovak	4 180 908 (23.77%)	4 472 871 (23.32%)	4 955 397 (23.23%)	6 435 983 (23.02%)
Polish	3 238 534 (14.86%)	3 719 232 (15.85%)	4 259 152 (16.62%)	4 967 984 (17.77%)
Ruthenian	2 792 667 (12.80%)	3 105 221 (13.23%)	3 375 576 (13.17%)	3 518 854 (12.58%)
Slovenian	1 140 304 (5.23%)	1 176 672 (5.01%)	1 192 780 (4.65%)	1 252 940 (4.48%)
Serbian – Croat	563 615 (2.59%)	644 926 (2.75%)	711 380 (2.78%)	783 334 (2.80%)
Italian – Ladin	668 653 (3.07%)	675 305 (2.88%)	727 102 (2.84%)	768 422 (2.75%)
Romanian	190 799 (0.88%)	209 110 (0.89%)	230 963 (0.90%)	275 115 (0.98%)
Magyar	9 887 (0.05%)	8 139 (0.04%)	9 516 (0.04%)	10 974 (0.04%)
Indigenous population present	21 794 231	23 473 056	25 632 805	27 963 872

Notes

1. These words are a paraphrase of the kind of sociolinguistic terminology applied by Klaus Bochmann to the French Revolution. See Brumme, Jenny and Klaus Bochmann (eds.) (1993) *Sprachpolitik in der Romania. Zur Geschichte sprachpolitischen Denkens und Handelns von der französischen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart*. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter.
2. In historical studies in the German-speaking world this step was first taken in Otto Brunner's systematic historicisation of concepts. Together with Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck, he produced the 8-volume reference work *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 8 vols., (1972–1993). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
3. In his work on the Mediterranean region in the time of Philip II, Fernand Braudel distinguished three levels of historical structure: those of 'long duration', such as climatic or geographical circumstances; those of medium-term duration, i. e. collectives and social beings, and those of 'short duration' that may be captured in the history of events. Braudel not only developed these concepts, but also applied them in a very methodical way. (Cf. Braudel, Fernand [1992] *Geschichte und Sozialwissenschaften. Die lange Dauer*. In *Schriften zur Geschichte*, vol 1. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 49–87.)
4. Rumpler, Helmut (1997) *Eine Chance für Mitteleuropa. Bürgerliche Emanzipation und Staatsverfall in der Habsburgermonarchie*. In *Österreichische Geschichte 1804–1914*. Wien: Ueberreuter, 11.
5. The Archbishops of Cologne, Mainz and Trier, the Palatine Prince of the Rhineland, the Duke of Saxony, the Margrave of Brandenburg and the King of Bohemia. From the 17th century onwards also the Dukes of Bavaria and of Brunswick-Lüneburg.
6. Cf. Zöllner, Erich (1988) *Der Österreichbegriff. Formen und Wandlungen in der Geschichte*. (Österreich-Archiv 103). Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik.
7. These territories to some extent correspond to the modern provinces of Upper and Lower Austria, although one should not think of territorial but rather of legal entities. Even today the River Enns forms the border between the two provinces.
8. Thanks to its tight organisation, the Jesuit Order had, in developing its school and educational system (the Universities of Graz, Innsbruck and Linz were founded by them), material and intellectual resources that were often unavailable to institutions that were funded by the estates, such as the *Landschaftschule* ['estates school'] in Graz.
9. In 1679, Emperor Leopold I published a 'Tractatus de iuribus incorporalibus', in which he sought to make it possible for peasant subjects to appeal to the prince's court in their own country, rather than to their local landlord.

10. Here we should remember the founding of the Viennese *Stadtbanco* in 1705–1706 and the *Universalsbanalität* in 1714. Both institutions facilitated the rapid availability of capital for the court without the need for taxes to be sanctioned by the estates.
11. The frequently used term ‘Crownland’ refers in general to the fact that a country belonged to the sphere of power of a crown (e. g. Moravia belonged to the Bohemian crown of Wenceslas, Croatia belonged to the Hungarian crown of Stephen, etc.), but especially after 1848 ‘Crownland’ referred particularly to the countries of the Austrian crown.
12. With the end of patrimonial jurisdiction, the administration of civil and criminal law in their own territory was taken from the noble rulers and transferred to the newly created state authorities.
13. See section 3.3 for more discussion of this.
14. Merely for illustration, we may point out here that events such as a constitutional decree were considerably influenced by a complex network of internal and external political occurrences, e. g. the lost war against Italy and the loss of Lombardy in 1859, the state financial crisis and the constant changes in the political constellation.
15. See Map 1. These units were all relevant to state politics, because all the local assemblies sent their representatives to the lower house of parliament until the electoral reform of 1873. These ‘Kingdoms and Territories represented in the *Reichsrat*’ were the Kingdoms of Bohemia, Dalmatia and Galicia-Lodomeria; the Archduchies of Austria above and below the Enns; the Duchies of Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Krain, Silesia and Bukowina; the Margravates of Moravia and Istria; the Princely Counties of Tirol and Görz-Gradisca; the Land of Vorarlberg; the City of Trieste.
16. Rumpler (1997: 409).
17. After 1861 electoral law recognised 4 electoral colleges: large landowners, chambers of trade and craftsmanship, towns and markets, and rural communities. The franchise depended on the level of tax payment. In the course of the electoral reform movements before 1907, the threshold was reduced several times and finally abolished, a fifth, general electoral college was established and the total number of representatives allocated to each college was increasingly linked to the number of voters.
18. In the 1910 census the Cisleithanian population was made up as follows: 35.6% German, 23% Czechs, 17.8% Poles, 12.6% Ruthenians, 4.5% Slovenians, 2.8% Serbs and Croats, 2.7% Italians – a category which also included Ladins and Friulians – 1% Romanians, and 0.02% other groups. Cf. also Putzger (2001: 144) and Appendix.
19. This formulation is from Karl Renner, the first state chancellor of the Republic of Austria, who published (under a pseudonym) a political tract entitled ‘Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat’ [‘The Battle of the Austrian Nations for the State’].

20. In 1897, Prime Minister Count Badeni had passed language decrees for Bohemia which required parallel use of the Czech and German official languages even in areas with a purely German-speaking population. As a result, there was a revolt of the German speakers, which culminated in a paralysis of the work of the parliament.
21. Cf. Appendix: Results of the Census of Vernacular Languages in Cisleithania between 1880 and 1910, quoted according to Brix 1982: 436–437.
22. Kann, Robert A. (1980) 'Zur Problematik der Nationalitätenfrage in der Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918'. In Wandruszka and Urbanitsch 1980: 1313–1330.
23. In three 'wars of independence' the first combatant was the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia, then the Kingdom of Italy against the Habsburg monarchy for the territories of Upper Italy. After the first military confrontation over Lombardy–Venetia in 1848–1849 ended in favour of the Habsburg monarchy, first Lombardy, after the war of 1859, and then Venice after the new conflict of 1866, joined the Kingdom of Italy.